“Aarushi Talwar Murder Case: Demystifying Series of Circumstantial Evidence.”

By-Rishabh Taneja & Anshu Rajput

“As she melts into the ocean of time mysteriously, still her soul craves for justice, with expectation that one day; the light of the divine court will enlighten and say ‘Return, O Children of Man!..’”

— Anonymous



 ‘Every criminal leaves a trace’, one such principle which aptly summarized Edward Locard’s “Theory of Exchange.” In voluminous cases, this principle has reaffirmed itself to the extent that justice has prevailed in each one of them. The idea is firmly subjective; but acts as a compelling and motivating factor simultaneously to signify the direction to proceed in the investigation and the thirst to find evidence to take down the criminal. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution unequivocally points toward the principle of “Social Justice”. Aristotle says “Man is by nature a social animal.” Having stated that, it is a well settled fact that this social animal i.e. every human reacts differently to different situations. This universal fact is the very basis in understanding and establishing the foundation of formation and disruption in the chain of events in Aarushi Talwar Murder Case. This fact will not only clarify the conduct of the accused couple, but also the conduct of the investigating agencies of the system; which shook the foundation of justice and led to such a situation which any human could have barely imagined.

This paper tries to explore the minutest details of circumstantial evidence, in accordance and vision with the Indian Evidence Law and streamline the string of situations which could have been avoided by due diligence and intelligence by non-contamination of the initial crime scene. This case is a perfect example which turned out to be an emotional turmoil for the society and still will be remembered vastly in criminal jurisprudence.


  1. The accused couple in the case was Dr. Rajesh Talwar, specialized in Prosthetic Dentistry and Dr. Nupur Talwar, specialist in Orthodontics who filed an appeal in the Allahabad High Court under section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment of Ghaziabad Trial Court, which convicted and sentenced them to a rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.10,000/- each under section 302/34 of the I.P.C.
  2. The Ghaziabad Trial Court also held them in conviction under section 201/34 of I.P.C and sentenced them to five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5000/-. Additionally, Dr. Rajesh Talwar was convicted under section 203 of I.P.C. and sentenced to a simple imprisonment of one year with a fine of Rs.2000/- and all the sentences were to run concurrently.
  3. The accused were the residents of L-32, Jalvayu Vihar-Noida and were residing there with their beloved daughter Aarushi and a servant named Hemraj, who was employed for daily domestic drudgeries and household chores in the apartment. Hemraj also occupied the room in the same flat.
  4. On 15.05.2008, the appellants presented their daughter Aarushi, a Sony Digital Camera as an advanced birthday gift and she had a very exciting and a happy state of moments with her family. Post this, Aarushi went to sleep and Dr. Rajesh Talwar had to send an e-mail to the American Dentistry Association; so he asked Dr. Nupur Talwar to switch on the internet router in Aarushi’s bedroom. Dr. Nupur Talwar complied, leaving the key of Aarushi’s bedroom into the lock. The air conditions were switched on which were very noisy.
  5. On 16.05.2008, the temporary maid Bharti Mandal rang the doorbell of the flat two times but there was no response. She put her hand on the outer grill door but it did not open. She pressed the bell again and Dr. Nupur Talwar opened the door and stated that the key of the door might be with Hemraj, who must have gone to fetch milk and told Bharti Mandal to go to the ground floor so that she could throw the spare key.
  6. Meanwhile, Dr. Nupur called Hemraj on his mobile. The call was connected and then got disconnected. Bharti Mandal stated that Dr. Nupur Talwar told her that the door was not locked but latched from outside; and this was denied by Dr. Nupur Talwar. Bharti Mandal climbed up the stairs, put her hand on the iron grill door again and it opened.
  7. She suddenly heard the couple weeping and inquired about the same. Dr. Nupur Talwar embraced her and escorted her to Aarushi’s room; she pulled the bed sheet in which her daughter was covered and found Aarushi’s dead body with her throat jugulated and slit. Within hours of discovery, the flat was crowded with people, police and strangers.
  8. On the arrival of police, Dr. Rajesh Talwar scribed the report of occurrence with his probable degree of possibility and stated that the servant, Hemraj murdered his daughter Aarushi with sharp weapons and went missing from the previous night and he might have absconded. The investigation was done by S.I. Data Ram Nauneria who recorded the statements and collected the additional evidence.
  9.  On 17.05.2008, the lock put on the terrace of the Talwars was broken and Hemraj’s dead body lying in pool of blood was found covered with the panel of cooler and dragging marks were visible on the terrace. Meanwhile, Talwars were on their way to Haridwar and a call was received by Dr. Rajesh Talwar regarding the discovery of dead body. Further statements were recorded and evidence was collected & the investigation was transferred to Mr. Anil Samania. After few days, Dr, Rajesh Talwar was arrested as the prime suspect in the double murder case.
  10. The case was then transferred to the C.B.I which recovered 14 articles from the place of occurrence and took possession of bloodstained palm print on the terrace wall. Krishna Thadaria, the clinic employee of Dr. Rajesh Talwar was arrested and three articles including khukri,(a sharp edged knife)having specks of blood and a purple color pillow cover were recovered from his residence.
  11. Krishna underwent the lie-detector test, polygraph test, narco-analysis and brain-mapping test. The results indicated the presence of Rajkumar and Vijay Mandal in the house of Talwars at that night. A report was filed by C.B.I under Section 169 of C.R.P.C and Dr. Rajesh Talwar was released on custody.
  12. The investigation was then transferred to Richh Pal Singh and then to AGL Kaul. The closure report submitted by AGL Kaul was rejected by the Special Judicial Magistrate and he himself took cognizance of offence under Section 190(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code and a trail was ordered against Dr. Rajesh and Dr. Nupur Talwar.
  13. The order of trial was challenged in Allahabad High Court as well as in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India but was dismissed and the case was finally tried in the Sessions Court, Ghaziabad.
  14. The Ghaziabad Sessions court held the appellants convicted and awarded sentences accordingly.
  15. Finally, after an appeal to the Allahabad High Court,  the Talwars were acquitted by the Court on the basis of benefit of doubt. The conviction by the Sessions Court was set aside and it was held that the sentence awarded to the accused cannot be sustained.


Circumstantial evidence is the direct evidence which relates to a series of other facts than facts in issue: but by experience have been found so associated with the fact in issue in relation of cause and effect that it leads to satisfactory conclusion.[1] It is always primary and the facts from which the existence of the fact in issue to be inferred must be proved by direct evidence. In Sarad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra[2], the Supreme Court laid down five golden principles of circumstantial evidence. The Allahabad High Court applied the test to the judicial scrutiny in Aarushi’s murder case and made out the following extrapolations and inferences:

  1. Principle I- The circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn must be fully established.  
  2. It is based on the grammatical and legal distinction between “must” and “may”. It means that the circumstances should be such which directly point towards the guilt of the accused and all the vague conjectures must be eliminated. The High Court rejected the proposed proposition of the prosecution as to motive which stated the grave and sudden provocation of Dr. Rajesh Talwar on seeing Aarushi and Hemraj in a compromising position.
  3. In support of this, the Court stated that the report prepared by Dr. M.S. Dahiya was based on the information supplied to him by the C.B.I. officer which stated that Hemraj’s blood was found on Aarushi’s pillow cover was invalid as the prior report prepared by Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) indicated the sole presence of Aarushi’s blood on pillow cover.
  4. The Court rejected Dr. Sunil Kumar Dohra’s report regarding whitish discharge in the private parts of Aarushi with vaginal cavity wide open as the same was not provided in the first three statements of the doctor & later he termed them as “subjective” findings. The Court stated that the report had no credible basis as to the fact that Aarushi was sexually assaulted as the column in the report “any other additional information” was left blank in the initial report.
  5. In case of vagina of a 13-14 years old deceased girl, neither orifice would by found open nor vaginal canal will be visible as orifice is found to be open in only those women who have given birth to several children; this is called “Prolapse”.[3]                                                     

The Allahabad High Court took all the above mentioned circumstances under the vicinity of this principle and found that the chain of events forming the circumstances was not fully established and there were loopholes in the same; which implicated that the chain of circumstances put forth by the prosecution was broken and embryonic.

  • Principle II- The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
  • This principle lays down that once the facts are established; they must be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.  The facts so established should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except the accused is guilty.[4]
  • In Aji Kumar v. State of Kerala[5], the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “Suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof of conviction.” This fact can be placed in Aarushi’s case to the point of double edged suspicion both on the accused as well as of botched up method of investigative agencies.
  • The two key witnesses of the prosecution were the driver and maid of the accused i.e. Umesh Sharma and Bharti Mandal. Umesh Sharma stated that no other person was present in the house, besides the accused couple and both the victims. Here last seen theory firmly comes into the picture.
  • In Ashok v. State of Maharshtra[6], it was held that last seen together itself is not a conclusive proof but along with other circumstances surrounding the incident, like relations between accused and deceased, enmity between them, previous history of hostility, recovery of weapon from the accused may lead to presumption of guilt.
  • However, no such evidence or chains of circumstances were there on record which stated that the accused was having an aversion to their victim daughter. However, there was one factor which could have been in the favor of prosecution i.e.  Non-explanation of death of the deceased.
  • The question arises is that if the hypothesis is pointing towards the guilt of the accused; but the explanation appended to that the hypothesis keeps on changing then whether the verisimilitude of the truth can be affected or not. A cursory glance at the judgment states that the prosecution was not able to prove that which the apt murder weapon was ranging from khukri, medical dentistry instrument or the golf stick.
  • Hence, the explanation appended to the hypothesis actually went in the favor of the accused as the prosecution was not able to establish the apt murder weapon as this raised serious concerns on the credibility of the argument of the prosecution regarding murder weapon.
  • Additionally, the reports of Dr. Sunil Kumar Dohre had falsely deposed that vaginal cavity was open and vaginal canal was visible and that opening of cavity was prominent in as much as neither this fact was mentioned neither in the post-mortem examination report nor in his first four statements given to the investigating officer.

Hence, all these circumstances proposed by the prosecution were not able to establish the credibility of hypothesis as the explanation appending to those hypothesis kept on changing. Hence, it could not establish the presumption of guilt against the accused.

  •  Principle III -The circumstances must be of conclusive nature and tendency.
  • The Ghaziabad Trial Court placed its reliance on the fact that since no other person was present in the house; as per the testimony of Umesh Sharma, the driver, and there was no proof of any outsider entry into the flat, the accused couple was convicted of an offence; as the Trial Court found it a conclusive circumstance leading to a reasonable inference.
  • But, the Allahabad High Court, took into account the additional evidence. In paragraph 196 of the judgment, the Court stated that the call records of Hemraj depicted the location of Hemraj’s phone in Punjab. This was a very strong piece of evidence that on the intervening night of 15/5/2008 and 16/5/2008; some outsider was present in the apartment who took the possession of Hemraj’s phone. This incident turned out to be an obstruction in establishing the conclusiveness of the circumstances.
  • Principle IV- Circumstances should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved.
  • As far as Aarushi Talwar Murder Case is concerned, there were overlapping arguments made by the prosecution as there was one hypothesis but multiple sub-hypothesis. The explanations appended to the arguments by the prosecution were too ambiguous.
  • Firstly, no inference could be drawn as to the apt murder weapon used. Secondly, the medical reports completely eradicated the possibility of sexual intercourse or assault on the deceased victim by Hemraj.
  • The Allahabad High Court took into consideration the Sound Simulation test and Crime Scene Reconstruction Report and stated that both the reports were in alignment with the defence of the accused as the C.B.I failed to present the report in the trial court. These report clearly established that even if the accused were sleep with their air conditioners on, during the night; the entry of the outsiders could not have been heard by the accused couple because of the rough and loud noise being emanated by the air conditioners.
  • Following this, the chain of circumstances establishing the guilt of the accused was broken to a massive extent and a violent blow was given to the prosecution’s version of the story.
  • Principle V- There must be a chain of events so complete as not to have any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of accused .
  • As far as this principle is concerned, it implicates the fact that the chain of circumstances must be in alignment with the chain of evidence and inferences must point towards the guilt of the accused.
  • In Aarushi’s murder case, an initial report (labeled as “Ext. Ka 51), was made which successfully established the presence of Hemraj’s DNA on a purple color pillow cover recovered from Krishna’s residence. But a further forwarding letter suggested that there was a typographical error and the pillow recovered from Hemraj’s room was labeled as one which was recovered from Krishna’s room.[7] The High Court stated it was a “clinching piece of evidence” that indicated that Krishna was present in the flat when Hemraj was murdered.

Hence, it can be firmly extrapolated by that if the chain of circumstances proposed by both the prosecution and the defence was compared with the chain of evidences, there are multiple lacunas in regard to inconsistencies between the two. If the evidence is weighed on an abstract calculus, it implicates the situation where some outsider was present in the flat on the intervening night. Hence, the view adopted by Allahabad High Court appears to be as per the objective assessment of the situation in consideration of consistent chain of evidence. Hence, the Panchsheel rule favored the accused couple firmly.


Dr. Rajesh Talwar and Dr. Nupur Talwar were acquitted by the Allahabad High Court on the basis of “benefit of doubt” and the Court additionally stated that neither the circumstances nor the evidence was enough to hold the dentist couple guilty. The circumstances were inadequate and their life sentence was quashed and C.B.I had failed miserably to supplement the lacunas in the evidence.[8]

The High Court of Allahabad took recourse to Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act and observed that it lays down only this much that if a fact is in the “special knowledge of person” and the other side could not have due knowledge of it despite exercising due diligence, then the burden of proving the fact lies on such person who possess such special knowledge. In the instant case, the prosecution was unable to prove the testimony of its key witness, Bharti Mandal, as her statements kept on changing timely. The Court stated that the prosecution failed to prove the compliances of Section 106 for proving that both the deceased victims were seen in a compromising position with each other.

The Court also criticized the “botched-up” investigation of the agencies and sporadic time lapses. The conclusive remarks of the Allahabad High Court were that the chain of circumstances stood snapped the moment and prosecution failed to prove by cogent and reliable evidence that appellant’s flat was locked from inside.”


Apart from Sarad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharshtra[9], the Allahabad High Court cited two more precedents in support of their view which are as follows:

In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh[10], the Apex Court put forth the view that another golden thread which runs through the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and another to his innocence, “the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted”.

In M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra[11], the Apex Court held that if the circumstances proved in a case are consistent either with the innocence of the accused, or with his guilt, then the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

In view of Article 141 o the Constitution of India and as per the circumstances objectively proposed in this case, the two precedents cited by the bench stood in favor of the accused couple and lead to the inference of their innocence and their entitlement to the benefit of doubt.


All in all, it can be firmly extrapolated that Aarushi Talwar Murder Case went on being an epitome expression of what we today call as “The Perfect Murder Mystery.” Notwithstanding the fact of presence of voluminous evidences and exhibits, the abstract calculus of evidence was very intricate to be drawn since the chain of circumstances must be in alignment with the chain of evidences. However, while reading the both Ghaziabad Trial Court judgment and the Allahabad High Court Judgment, the reader feels that the latter judgment is more precise and accurate as precedents cited by the bench were very much in consonance with the circumstances proposed in the present case.

Recollecting the abstract at the beginning of this paper, it is mentioned that every human reacts differently to different situations. In this case, the reasoning which was given in the Ghaziabad Trial Court was that the conduct of the accused couple was not palatable as it is a natural act that if parents see the dead body of their daughter, they will not hug her”. This reasoning appears absurd and out of line.

Since reactions of humans are different, they conduct themselves differently. This could also be questioned regarding the conduct of investigative agencies as many Investigating Officers were changed and each officer conducted the investigation in his own manner; which lead to “botched-up” circumstances. The circumstances were so botched up that even today the veracity of murder weapon is not corroborated and the murderer remains absconding and Aarushi’s soul still thrives for justice.

[1] Batuk Lal, The Law of Evidence, Central Law Agency, (22nd Edition), Page 64.

[2] AIR 1973 SC 2622.

[3]  V.G. Padubidri, Shaw’s Textbook of Gynaecology, (16th Edition), Page 9.

[4] Batuk Lal, The Law Of Evidence, Central Law Agency, (22nd Edition), Page 70

[5] AIR 2017 SC 695

[6] 2015 Cri LJ 2036, Page 2039.

[7] Aniruddha Ghoshal, Aarushi Talwar Murder Case: Key Evidences That Caught Attention, available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/india/aarushi-talwar-murder-case-rajesh-nupur-talwar-hemraj-noida-cbi-key-evidences-that-night-at-flat-l-32-4900539/ , last seen on 03/09/2020.

[8] Amita Verma, Aarushi Murder Case: Benefit of Doubt to Talwars Help,available at: https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/131017/aarushi-murder-case-benefit-of-doubt-to-talwars-help.html , last seen on 03/09/2020.

[9] AIR 1973 SC 2622.

[10] AIR 1973 SC 2773.

[11] AIR 1963 SC 200.


[AIR 2018 (2) SCALE 235]

By- Aayushi Mehta

“Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.”

― Carl Sagan


Keeping in cognizance of the social, political, and economic variations there has been fruition in the laws of our country. One of the chief introductions has been the Information and Technology Act of 2000 (ITA, 2000).

One of the key motives as to why ITA, 2000 was brought into force was that with the advancement of technology a step forward needed to be advanced towards the practice of laws in our country.

Furthermore, after the outline of this act, changes were brought into force in the Indian Evidence Act by way of the addition of Section 65A and 65B respectively to the act. Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act serves two main purposes.

  • Firstly, it enables the computer outputs to be produced as evidences in the court even if the original evidence has not been produced by a party.
  • Secondly, it has also empowered the consideration of e-records as deemed to be documents for the purpose of the Indian Evidence Act.

The best example of such an advancement is that during the stage of lockdown in our country the court hearings were carried out successfully on an online platform. Not only the hearings of court have become electronic but erstwhile to this there has been occasions where the evidences were also produced in the court in e-form. The only drawback that might occur during production of e-evidences is that they can be easily manipulated or destroyed.

Consequently, there always have been instances where the judiciary has also been futile to answer whether the production of the certificate should be mandatory for considering the admissibility of e-evidences or not.

Prior to the Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh judgment, there have been cases like the state (N.C.T. of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu andAnvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer & Ors., where the same question as to whether the production of the certificate be considered mandatory for considering the admissibility of e-evidences have been discussed.

The judgment of this case has, however, provided an easing on the issue of production of certificate for considering the admissibility of e-evidences. The relaxation has been only provided in cases where the party is not in possession of the device. 

Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 needs to be highlighted which states:

“The Central Government may, for the purposes of providing expert opinion on electronic form evidence before any court or other authority specify, by notification in the Official Gazette, any Department, body or agency of the Central Government or a State Government as an Examiner of Electronic Evidence.

Explanation. -For the purposes of this section, “electronic form evidence” means any information of probative value that is either stored or transmitted in electronic form and includes computer evidence, digital audio, digital video, cell phones, digital fax machines.”


The facts of the cases are as follows:

  1. The question that arose in this case was whether the videography of the crime scene should be taken into consideration while presenting a case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The issue that arose was a matter of utmost consideration which was to be determined after perceiving the proceedings in case of earlier hearings.
  2. Moving ahead with the case it was found that videography would prove to be essential evidence in the case. Further, it was highlighted in this case that videos, audios etc. could be considered as first-hand information and could work as strong evidence in a case.
  3. Also, in this case it was pointed out that post-mortem and dying declarations should be in video form.
  4. During the proceedings of this case it was also observed by the court that all evidences need to be taken into consideration before reaching on to the conclusion of a particular case. Therefore, it was adopted by the court that electronic evidences should also be taken into consideration and they will have the same authenticity like other evidences.
  5. Also question in this case also arose related to the authenticity and accuracy of the e-evidences produced as compared to the documentary evidences. As new technologies are subject to tampering there exist no exhaustive rules for judging the admissibility of such evidences.
  6. Therefore, the main issue in this case was the interpretation of section 65B (4) of the Indian Evidence Act.


The two major issues which arose in this case were:

  1. Whether during the process of investigation,video recording of the crime scene be considered as a necessary source to stimulate confidence in the evidences collected?
  2. What is the scope of applicability of the procedural necessities in case of e-evidences produced by an individual who is not in custody of the device fabricating the evidence-under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act?


The Hon’ble Supreme Court after hearing the case stated that a Central Oversight Body (COB) requires to be established by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The COB would be responsible for the planning and implementation of laws relating to the use of videography in the investigation of crime.

The use of videography would always depend on the feasibility of the case. Further, the court also ordered that CCTV should be installed in all police stations and prisons to ensure that the basic human rights of any detainee are not violated.

Also, the COB was duty-bound to appoint a committee which would study the CCTV footage and compile such information and submit a detailed report of the same within 3 months

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the second issue observed that the party who is not in the custody of a device that is being produced as an e-evidence is not permitted to produce a certificate under section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act.

This condition can only be omitted if the court finds that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. Therefore, the observations made by the Apex Court are as follows:

  1. E-evidences are absolutely permissible in the court of law.
  2. This section is to be applied in instances where the e-evidences is produced by a person who is in its possession and not by the opposite party.
  3. Further, the court observed that justice is said to be denied if a party who is in custody of the evidences does not produce it purely because the party proving it is not in possession of the certificate under section 65B (4).
  4. Prerequisite of a certificate is not always considered to be obligatory.The party who is not is ownership of the device from which the document is produced cannot be obligated to produce a certificate under this section.

Therefore, it can be clearly stated that a certificate under section 65B (4) is not always mandatory. Sometimes, relaxation on the basis of “in the interest of justice” should be taken into consideration.



By- Anjanee Goel

Complainant- Canada

Respondent- European Communities

GATT Articles III: 4, XX and XXXIII: 1(b)

It was a case regarding France’s ban on asbestos. The issue in this case was between imported asbestos and products containing asbestos versus certain domestic substitutes such as PVA, cellulose and glass (“PCG”) fibres and products containing such substitutes.

In this case, France prohibited the manufacture, processing, sale, and importation of asbestos fibers and products containing asbestos fibers, although it allowed the production and sale of asbestos substitutes. Therefore, the ban clearly benefited domestic producers of asbestos substitutes over their foreign asbestos-producing competitors. In the context of the discussion of “like” product, the Appellate Body said that health risks are to be considered in the Article III:4 “like product” inquiry.

In EC-Asbestos, the Appellate Body made it look as if the purpose of the regulatory measure was relevant to applying the “like product” tests, thus giving support to those who would read purpose into the analysis of Article III. However, the purpose of a measure has no role other than to help apply the competitive relationship test.

Regulatory purpose is not an independent reason for finding that products are not “like.” Instead, it is simply a fact that helps us understand the competitive relationship between imported and domestic goods. The Appellate Body integrated a consideration of health factors into two of the Border Tax Adjustments criteria: physical properties and consumers’ tastes and habits.

Thus, when determining which physical properties are relevant to the “like product” inquiry, “panels have got to inspect those physical properties of products that are probable to persuade the competitive affiliation between products in the market.

Since the Appellate Body established the Panel’s likeness scrutiny amongst asbestos and PCG fibres as well as amongst cement-based products comprising of asbestos and those having PCG fibres deficient, it rejected and reversed the Panel’s rulings that the products at question were alike and that the measure was incompatible with Article III: 4.

The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s ruling that the ban was acceptable as an exemption under Article XX (b). The Panel also established that the steps taken fulfilled the conditions of the Article XX, i.e. chapeau, as the measure neither constituted a disguised restriction on international trade, nor led to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.

The Panel after applying Article XXIII: 1(b) to the measure in question finally discarded Canada’s claim and ruled that the measure did not result in mutilation under Article XXIII: 1(b), due to Canada having rationale to expect a ban on asbestos.

[1] DS 135: European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos



By- Gruleen Kaur

The Shrimp-Turtle case is an important contribution to the debate on environment and the trade and also involves trade measures that are quite similar to that of employed in the case of Tuna Dolphin. In this case, the US had imposed ban against all the countries that do not enforce restrictions on the use of fishing methods which directly and adversely affects the lives of the turtles.

The case was presented before WTO Appellate Body which gave a very different reasoning if compared to Tuna Dolphin case and expressed great sympathy for the goal of environmental protection. The sine qua non of the case are:-

  • This case fully completes the reformed interpretation of GATT Article XX (g), which the Appellate body had introduced in the United States- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline case.
  • The body further contended the trade measures into three elements:-
  • Concerns exhaustible natural resources;
  • Conservation related to those exhaustible natural resources;
  • Is made in consonance with the restrictions on domestic production or the exhaustible consumption natural resources.

[1] DS58: United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products



By- Gruleen Kaur

This is a very important and attracts lot of attention as it includes provisions explained under Article XX of GATT which stipulates the General Exceptions and the implications for environmental disputes. However, this case does not have any status of legal interpretation of GATT law as the panel report was circulated in 1991, but was not adopted. Thus, the same was settled out of the court.

The United States’ Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) imposes a ban on imports of tuna from countries that did not have a conservation program designed to protect dolphins in the tuna-fishing process. The facts of the case states that in eastern tropical areas of the Pacific Ocean, schools of yellow fin tuna swim beneath schools of dolphins. When tuna is harvested with the help of purse seine nets, dolphins are trapped in the nets which results in their death. So, US had imposed ban on Mexican Tuna imports. The important questions arose were:-

  1. Can one country tell another as to what its environmental regulations should be?
  2. Do trade rules permit action to be taken against the method used in the production of goods?
  3. Mexico contended that the ban is inconsistent with Articles III, XI & XIII and is also violating the objective of its Preamble (Chapeau).

The dispute resolution panel decided the case and contended that US could not justify the ban on Mexican Tuna. They have applied reasonability test and trade restrictive measures to justify their decision and the reasons for the same are as follows:-

  • The US could not use the Article XX exceptions to regulate natural resources outside of its borders.
  • The US could not prove that it was least trade-trade restrictive way to protect dolphins; neither had it initiated dolphin- protection agreements with other countries.
  • It was said that an agreement must not be inconsistent with the Preamble of the Act, i.e., Chapeau.
  • The Panel found that neither the primary nor the intermediary nation embargo was covered under Article III, that both were contrary to Article XI.
  • The panel gave priority to free trade over environmental protection in consonance with the provisions of Article XX(b), (g) or (d) of the GATT.

[1] DS381: United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products



By- Anjanee Goel

Under the Japanese tax system at issue in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the internal tax imposed on domestic shochu was the same as that imposed on imported shochu; the higher tax imposed on imported vodka was also imposed on domestic vodka. Identical items (not bearing in mind brand distinctions) were therefore, taxed identically. However, the issue was whether shochu and vodka ought to be considered as ‘like products’.

The Appellate Body addressed the span of the conception of ‘like products’ within the meaning of Article III: 2, 1st sentence. The Appellate Body primarily stated that this notion ought to be interpreted scarcely due to the subsistence of the concept of ‘directly competitive or substitutable products’ utilized in the 2nd sentence of Article III:2.

Consequently, the Appellate Body specifically agreed with the basic approach for determining ‘likeness’ specified in the 1970 Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments.

In applying the criteria cited in Border Tax Adjustments to the facts of any particular case, and in considering other criteria that may also be relevant in certain cases, panels can only apply their best judgment in determining whether in fact products are “like”. This will always involve an unavoidable element of individual, discretionary judgment.

[1] DS8: Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages


By- Muskaan Singh

Facts of the case:

The NAZ Foundation (India) Trust (NI) is a New Delhi based NGO that has been functioning on HIV/AIDS and sexual wellbeing from 1994 onwards. They recorded a writ appeal in the Delhi High Court testing the protected legitimacy of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code.

This area punishes unlawful sexual acts ‘against the order of nature’ which has the impact of condemning even consensual sex between two grown-ups of a similar sex or even of the other gender enjoying penile non-vaginal sexual exercises.

The petitioner battled that Section 377 infringed upon Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India and furthermore that the section should not to condemn consensual penile non-vaginal sex between two consenting grown-ups of a similar sex.

In an achievement judgment passed on July 2, 2009, the Delhi High Court concluded that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ignored different crucial rights, including the privilege to protection and right to pride under Article 21, Article 14, and Article 15.

The said choice was claimed against in the Supreme Court of India in the Suresh Kumar Koushal and another versus NAZ Foundation and Others case and it was held that the Delhi High Court wasn’t right in its discoveries and was additionally off-base in perusing down the area to permit consensual homosexual exercises between two grown-ups of a similar sex.


The Appellants’ denied that Section 377 was unconstitutional and made a variety of submissions as to why it was not:

  1. The High Court did a serious mistake by announcing Section 377 as breach of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution as it disregarded the absence of any essential realities in the Respondent’s writ which would be vital for articulating upon the legality of any legal arrangement. The narrative proof provided in its place was not a reason for finding that homosexual people were singled out for unfair treatment by the law.
  2. The measurements consolidated in the Respondent’s request were deficient for finding that Section 377 adversely influenced the control of HIV AIDS and that decriminalization would lessen the quantity of such cases. The Appellants additionally contended that the information introduced was made and fake.
  3. Section 377 is completely unbiased and covers deliberate acts of physical intercourse irrespective of the sex of people committing the intercourse. As no particular class is focused by the law, no grouping has been made, subsequently rendering the finding of the High Court that it outraged Article 14 to be without base.
  4. Section 377 does not breach the right to privacy and dignity under Article 21 and the right to privacy does not include the right to commit any offence as defined under Section 377 or any other section.
  5. If the declaration were approved, India’s social structure and the institution of marriage would be influenced and it would make youngsters become enticed towards homosexual activities.
  6. Courts by their very nature ought not attempt the assignment of legislating which should be left to Parliament. The High Court was uncertain whether it was cutting off the law or perusing it down and, as long as the law is on the statute book, there is an constitutional assumption in support of it. Regardless of whether a law is good or improper is an issue that ought to be left to Parliament to choose.

The Respondents submitted:

  1. Section 377 focuses on the LGBT people group by condemning a firmly held personal for example, sexual direction. By covering inside its ambit consensual acts between people inside the privacy of their homes, it is repulsive to the right to equality. Sexual rights and sexuality are human rights ensured under Article 21. Section 377 in this way denies LGBT of their full good citizenship.
  2. The criminalization of specific activities which are a declaration of the core sexual character of gay men portrays them as lawbreakers with malicious results hindering their human poise. As Section 377 outlaws sexual action between men which is by its very nature penile and non-vaginal, it impacts gay men at a profound level and confines their entitlement to pride, personhood and character, uniformity and right to wellbeing by condemning all types of sex that gay men can indulge in.
  3. Sexual closeness is a main part of human experience and is imperative to emotional wellness, mental prosperity and social modification. By condemning sexual acts occupied with by gay men, they are denied this human experience while the equivalent is permitted to heterosexual.
  4. The Court should assess changing qualities and the worldly sensibility of Section 377. The Constitution is a living record and it ought to stay adaptable to meet recently developing issues and difficulties. The disposition of Indian culture is quick changing and the actions which were treated as an offense should not, at this point be made corrective.
  5. The right to equality under Article 14 and the right to dignity and privacy under Article 21are interlinked and must be fulfilled for other constitutional rights to be truly effectuated.
  6. The difference between obscene acts in private and public is recognized in Section 294. It should be read in light of constitutional provisions which include the right to be let alone.
  7. Section 377 is impermissibly indistinct, delegates policy making forces to the police, and results in the harassment and abuse of the privileges of LGBT people. Appellants gave proof of across the board harassment and abuse (referring to legal proof and NGO reports).
  8. Section 377 doesn’t set out any rule or strategy for practicing tact with regards to which of the considerable number of cases falling under the extensively stated law might be examined. It is quiet on whether the offense can be committed inside the home.
  9. Criminalization expands disgrace and segregation and goes about as a hindrance to HIV avoidance programs. It stops health services by anticipating the assortment of HIV information, hindering scattering of data, safeguarding the supply of condoms; restricting access health services, driving the network underground, eliminating exposure of manifestations, making a nonattendance of safe spaces prompting dangerous sex.

Judgment of the case:

The Supreme Court judges overruled the High Court’s past choice, seeing its affirmation as “legally unsustainable”. The Supreme Court at last found that Section 377 IPC doesn’t violate the Constitution and dismissed the writ appeal documented by the Respondents. Regarding its capacity to run on the legality of a law, the Supreme Court recognized that it and the High Court are empowered to declare any law void, regardless of whether authorized before the establishment of the Constitution or after.

However, it noted that there is a presumption of constitutionality in favour of all laws, including pre-constitutional laws, as the Parliament is deemed to act for the benefit of the people. The Court noted that the doctrine of severability seeks to enable unconstitutional portions of laws to be severed from the constitutional elements of the law in question with the leftover portion held and that, on the other hand, that Court has the alternative of “reading down” a law to keep it from being rendered unlawful, while ceasing from changing the quintessence of the law.

With respect to Section 377 the court saw that while it and the High Court had the option to audit the lawfulness of the law, and had the option to strike it down to the extent of its inconsistency with the Constitution, the analysis must be guided by the presumption of constitutionality and the courts must exercise self-restraint.

The court presumed that except if a reasonable sacred infringement was demonstrated, the court was not engaged to nullify the law.

In deciding the utilization of Article 14 of the Constitution to the lawfulness of Section 377, the Supreme Court cited from Re: Special Courts Bill, 1987 (1979) 1 SCC 380, which set out the extent of Article 14, including the rule that enactment need not treat all individuals precisely the equivalent, however that “all people likewise circumstanced will be dealt with the same both in benefits presented and liabilities forced”.

Further, the State had “the intensity of figuring out who ought to be viewed as a class for motivations behind enactment and corresponding to a law established on a specific subject” given that such characterization was not “self-assertive” yet: “Balanced, in other words, it must not exclusively be founded on certain characteristics or attributes which are to be found in all the people assembled and not in other people who are forgotten about however those characteristics or qualities must have a sensible connection to the object of the enactment”.

With little investigation, the court held that: “The individuals who enjoy bodily intercourse in the conventional course and the individuals who enjoy trench intercourse against the request for nature comprise various classes and the individuals falling in the last classification can’t guarantee that Section 377 experiences the bad habit of intervention and unreasonable characterization”.

In reviewing the perusing down of the Section 377 by the High Court, the Supreme Court expressed that the High Court had neglected the way that “a miniscule division of the nation’s populace establish lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgenders” and that in the course of the most recent 150 years, less than 200 people had been indicted under Section 377, closing from this that “this can’t be made sound reason for pronouncing that section ultra vires the arrangements of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.”

The court likewise respected the biased treatment complained by the Naz Foundation because of Section 377 as being neither commanded nor approved by the arrangement itself and the way that the police specialists and others abuse Section 377 was not an impression of the vires of the arrangement however rather may basically be an applicable factor for Parliament to consider while judging whether to change Section 377

Concerning use of Article 21 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court expressed that the law must be capability enacted while additionally being simply, reasonable and sensible, which offer ascent to ideas of genuine state intrigue and the standard of proportionality.

The court explicitly noticed that the option to live with poise had been perceived as a piece of Article 21. In surveying the High Court’s decision that Section 377 disregarded the privilege to security, self-governance and respect, the Supreme Court invested little energy investigating the utilization of Article 21 to Section 377, rather reprimanding the High Court for depending too broadly upon decisions from different wards in its tension to ensure the “purported privileges of LGBT people”. It presumed that “Section 377 doesn’t experience the ill effects of the bad habit of illegality” with no further elaboration.

The judges noticed that while the court found that Section 377 was not unlawful, the governing body was still to think about the attractive quality and appropriateness of erasing or altering the arrangement.

Application of Interpretation of Statues:

In the case of Naz Foundation, the Delhi Court used the golden rule of interpretation to avoid injustice which would not be kept away from if a mechanical translation of the language is done when court held that sexual orientation is a ground closely resembling sex in Article 15 and Thus, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation can’t “be allowed” by Article 15. In this manner, section 15 was discovered violative of Article 15.

Also, Court relied on the case of Anuj Garg vs. Hotel Association of India[1]and the standards down for this situation. All things considered, the demonstration being referred to was additionally a pre-constitutional legislation and in spite of the fact that it was spared regarding Article 14, 15 and 19 of the Constitution of India, was held as admissible in law.

There is along these lines no assumption of lawfulness of a frontier enactment. Thusly, however the rule could have been held to be a substantial bit of enactment keeping in see the cultural condition on those occasions, yet with the progressions happening in that both in the local as additionally worldwide field such a law can likewise be proclaimed invalid.

Court likewise went in to talk about and apply the guideline of severability. The supplication of the candidate was to pronounce Section 377 IPC as unlawful to the degree the said arrangement influences private sexual acts between consenting grown-ups in private with the goal that appropriateness of area 377 IPC keeps on packaging including non-consensual sex.

Two Kinds of Severability were discussed:

  1. Statutory provision may contain unmistakable and separate words managing particular and separate subjects. The principal sub section might be legitimate and the subsequent void. In such a case, the court may erase the subsequent sub area by regarding it as severable.
  2. There is anyway another sort of severability in particular severability in application, or severability in requirement. The subject of this other sort of severability emerges when a condemned arrangement is one resolute entirety. Here, severability can’t be applied by erasing a culpable arrangement and leaving the rest standing.

Thus, Court applied this second sort of severability to the arrangement and pronounced that section 377 IPC, insofar it condemns consensual sexual demonstrations of grown-ups in private, is violative of Article 21, 14 and 15 of the constitution.

The arrangements of Section 377 IPC were held to keep on overseeing non-consensual penile non-vaginal sex and penile non-vaginal sex including minors. This explanation was to be hold till, obviously, Parliament decides to alter the law to effectuate the suggestion of the Law Commission of India in its 172nd Report.

The Golden Rule:

It is known as the golden rule since it tackles all the issues of interpretation. The rule says that to begin with we will pass by the literal rule, however, if the interpretation given through the literal rule prompts a few or any sort of uncertainty, shamefulness, burden, hardship, disparity, at that point in every single such occasion the strict significance will be disposed of and interpretation will be done in such a way, that the motive behind the enactment is satisfied.

The literal rule follows the idea of interpreting the characteristic importance of the words utilized in the statute. However, if interpreting leads to any kind of repulsiveness, absurdity or hardship, at that point the court must alter the importance to the degree of injustice or absurdity caused and no further to forbid the result.

This rule proposes that the outcomes and impacts of interpretation merit significantly increasingly significant in light of the fact that they are the intimations of the true meaning of the words utilized by the law making body.

Now and again, while applying this rule, the understanding done may completely inverse of the literal rule, yet it will be supported as a result of the brilliant guideline. The assumption here is that the legislature doesn’t expect certain items. In this way, any such understanding which prompts unintended items will be dismissed.

Case laws:

Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 850

In this case, there was an issue as to giving of the notification under area 99 of Representation of People’s Act, 1951, as to degenerate practices engaged with the political decision.

According to the rule, the notification will be given to each one of those people who are involved with the political race appeal and simultaneously to the individuals who are not involved with it. Tirath Singh battled that no such notification was given to him under the said arrangement. The notification was just given to the individuals who were non-gatherings to the political race appeal. This was tested to be invalid on this specific ground.

The court held that what is pondered is giving of the data and the data regardless of whether it is given twice continues as before. The gathering to the appeal is now having the notification with respect to the request, in this way, segment 99 will be so deciphered by applying the brilliant principle that notice is required against non-parties as it were.


In the case of Suresh Koushal, the Apex Court a lot of accentuated on the precept of assumption of legality, even if there should arise an occurrence of a pre-protected resolution. Court held that there is nothing to recommend that this standard would not matter to pre-established laws which have been embraced by the parliament and utilized with or without revision.

On the off chance that no correction is made to a specific law it might speak to a choice that the council has taken to leave the law all things considered and this choice is the same as a choice to alter and change the law or sanction another law.

The 172nd Law commission report explicitly suggested cancellation of that section and the issue has more than once come easily proven wrong. Be that as it may, the council has decided not to change the law or return to it.

This shows the Parliament, which is undisputedly the agent body of the individuals of India Has not thought it legitimate to erase this arrangement. Court additionally saw that: “Except if an unmistakable sacred infringement is demonstrated, this court isn’t enabled to strike down a law just by uprightness of its falling into neglect or the impression of the general public having changed as respects the authenticity of its motivation and its need.

The Supreme Court additionally saw that who enjoy licentious intercourse in the conventional course and the individuals who enjoy animalistic intercourse against the request for nature comprises an alternate class and the individuals falling in a similar classification can’t guarantee that Section 377 experiences the bad habit of assertion and unreasonable order.

What Section 377 does is simply characterize the specific offense and recommend discipline for a similar which can be granted if in the preliminary directed as per the arrangements of the Code of Criminal Procedure and different sculptures of a similar family the individual is seen as blameworthy. Thusly, the High Court was not viewed as right in announcing Section 377 IPC Ultra vires.

The Supreme court likewise excused the “blindfolded” utilization of outside decisions by the Delhi High Court. It expressed that however these decisions shed significant light on different parts of this privilege and are educational corresponding to the predicament of sexual minorities, they can’t be applied blindfolded for choosing the legality of the law established by the Indian Legislature.

Thus, the court held that Section 377 IPC doesn’t experience the ill effects of the bad habit of illegality and the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court is legitimately unreasonable.

Finally, on 6 September 2018, the Court ruled unanimously in Navtej Singh Johar v. Association of India that Section 377 was unlawful “to the extent that it condemns consensual sexual direct between grown-ups of a similar sex “.

[1](2008) 3 SCC 1


By- Tanya Gupta

“(The complainant for this case was occupied with business of assembling and selling of Asbestos concrete sheets and unified items. It was asserted that one Gopala Krishna (A1) [Co-ordinator of “Boycott Asbestos India”, a party facilitated by Google (A2)] distributed certain slanderous articles focusing on a solitary maker of Asbestos concrete items viz., the complainant and prestigious lawmakers of the nation, G. Venkata Swamy and Sonia Gandhi who had nothing to do with the proprietorship or the executives of the complainant. These articles were accessible in the on the internet for overall crowd. The offenses were being executed from 31.07.2009 onwards i.e., before the change to the Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 which became effective from 27.10.2009.)”

In 2009, a criticism case was documented by Visaka Industries Ltd. (the ‘Organization’) against a party called Ban Asbestos Network India (‘BANI’), its facilitator Mr. Gopal Krishna and Google India.

The Company is engaged with the assembling and selling of asbestos concrete sheets and united items. The Company had asserted that a portion of the blog entries composed by Mr. Gopal Krishna which were posted on the blog possessed by BANI were slanderous in nature.

The blog entries contained searing analysis of the Company for supposedly appreciating political support and making benefits from items produced from asbestos. In its request before the metropolitan officer, the Company blamed that Google India is blameworthy for the accompanying offenses under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) criminal connivance (Section 120-B IPC), maligning (Section 500 IPC) and distributing abusive substance (Section 501 read with Section 34 IPC).

It was additionally asserted that Google India neglected to eliminate the supposed slanderous substance regardless of being brought to its notification. While the case was forthcoming before the metropolitan justice, Google India moved toward the Andhra Pradesh High Court (‘High Court’) under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 petitioning Lord for subduing of the apparent multitude of criminal accusations leveled against it.

Google India satisfied that it can’t be held at risk for criminal criticism under IPC as it isn’t the distributer of the supposed slanderous substance. Google India or Google Inc. is just delegate and specialist co-op that go about as a stage for end clients to transfer their substance.

Subsequently, middle people like Google India or Google Inc. can’t be held obligated taking into account Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (‘IT Act’) for criticism since they are neither creators nor distributers of such substance.

The High Court, nonetheless, excused Google India’s appeal through its request dated April 19, 2014. The High Court while alluding to Section 79(3) (b) of the IT Act held that Google India neglected to make any move either to obstruct or stop such spread of frightful material in spite of the Company giving a notification and carrying the disparaging material to the information on Google India.

Accordingly, the High Court would not give exceptions accessible to mediators under the IT Act to Google India either under the un-changed or the revised Section 79 of the IT Act which alteration produced results from October 27, 2009.

The High Court additionally wouldn’t drop the slander charges against Google India. Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court, Google India filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of India in 2011. Since then, the matter has been adjourned on several instances and was recently heard by a Supreme Court bench, the latest date of hearing being on November 24, 2016.


Supreme Court – The bench of Ashok Bhushan and KM Joseph, JJ has asked Google India to confront preliminary in a 2008 criminal slander matter and has held that Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, before its replacement, didn’t ensure a middle person with respect to the offense under Section 499/500 of the IPC.

Section 79 of the IT Act, preceding its replacement, absolved Network Service Provider from obligation just on demonstrating that the offense or repudiation was submitted without its information or that he had practiced all due perseverance to forestall the commission of such offense.

The Court was hearing an issue identifying with Criminal Defamation wherein an article was distributed by the Coordinator of Ban Asbestos India, a party facilitated by Google, slandering the complainant, a public restricted organization occupied with the matter of assembling and selling asbestos concrete sheets with seven assembling plants and more than 25 promoting workplaces all over India.

The article dated 31.07.2008 inscribed “Visaka Asbestos Industries making gains”. It was, subsequently, contended that the asbestos concrete sheets have been fabricated for over 70 years in India; nonetheless, the complainant was singled out however there are different parties producing asbestos concrete items.

Google India had contended that it was not the delegate and that the middle person is the Parent Company. On this the Court held that, in any event, continuing on the premise that the primary denounced is the originator, as characterized in the Act, of the supposedly slanderous issue, and the main charged isn’t just the creator but on the other hand is the distributer of purportedly disparaging issue, and again continuing on the premise that the appealing party, is the middle person and not its Parent Company, the refusal with respect to the litigant to eliminate the post, may add up to distribution” there may be publication within the meaning of Section 499 of the IPC even in the case of an internet operator, if having the power and the right and the ability to remove a matter, upon being called upon to do so, there is a refusal to do so.”

Some “Any other view would make it a despot strangling the free flow of ideas which is what the internet is all about.” The Court noticed that in Shreya Singhal v. Association of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, the arrangements were perused down to imply that Section 79(3) (b) of the Act and Rule 3(4) of the Rules, would require a network access administrator to takedown outsider data not on simple information on issue with its continuation yet after there has been an unprejudiced settling figuratively speaking by a court.

In any case, in the realities of this case, the demonstrations establishing the supposed offense under Section 499 of the IPC, were done not when Section 79, after its replacement, was set up. The Rules were instituted in the year 2011. “In such conditions, what we are approached to do is to import in the standards into the verifiable lattice when Section 79 was diversely worded and in procedures under Section 482 of the CrPC.”

The Court left open to the appealing party to encourage under the steady gaze of the Court the inquiry identifying with the failure of the Parent Company to eliminate the post without the court request.

The Court, in any case, said this is an inquiry which can be, autonomous of the non-accessibility of the security under Section 79 of the Act in its recent avtar, sought after by the appealing party.


By- Tanya Gupta

“In this case of Rakesh Kumar Paul versus State of Assam (2017) 15 SCC 67, the denounced charged under section 13(1) of the Prevention and Corruption Act for which discipline limit of 10 years.

The state contended that the greatest date for recording default bail would begin following 90 days. In any case, Justice Madan Bhimrao Lokur of the Honorable Supreme Court held that in such a case, the date of documenting default bail would be held at 60 days.

Since the discipline for the situation was at a limit of 10 years. No case for Grant of a default bail can be recorded under section 167 of the code. On account of the charge sheet has documented by the police before the termination of 60 or 90 days. Default bail is such a corrective reaction to the police for not recording the charge sheet in time after the primary remand of the occused.”

The Supreme Court’s view in Rakesh Kumar Paul v State of Assam, (2017) that in issues of individual flexibility, the courts can’t and ought not to be too specialized and should lean for individual freedom.

The nonexclusive guideline of criminal law is that “an individual is honest until demonstrated liable.” From even before the enlistment of a FIR till the consummation of the preliminary, the law accommodates numerous arrangements of bail.

In innumerable cases, the Supreme Court has held that bail is an individual’s outright right (in bailable offenses). Conceding of bail is the standard while sending to prison is the special case. All the time, we find out about expectant bail or ordinary bail. Yet, there is one more kind of bail that is moderately less known. This is called default bail.

“The grant of Bail is almost always dependent on merit except in cases of statutory or default bail, which is covered in section 167(2) of the Criminal Code of Procedure, 1973 where a trial Court grants bail to the applicant upon failure of the police to submit a charge-sheet within the stipulated time after the arrest. The subsection is further bifurcated to provide for entitlements of an accused of obtaining the bail.”

  • Section 57, CrPC: This part expresses an individual who is captured without a warrant can’t be kept in authority past a time of 24 hours. Such an individual must be delivered before the concerned Magistrate. The time of authority can go past 24 hours whenever indicated so by a unique request allowed under area 167.
  • Section 167(2), CrPC: Section 167 of CrPC sets down arrangements for situations when examination can’t be finished inside 24 hours. Subsection 2 of this segment engages the Magistrate to send the blamed in the authority for 15 days one after another. It further expresses that the complete time of such confinement will not surpass past:
  • 90 days, where the offense is culpable with death, life detainment, or detainment of 10 years,
  • 60 days, where the examination identifies with an offense other than those predefined above.


Given that there was no common clash between the perspectives on the Supreme Court in Rajeev Chaudhary and Bhupinder Singh, we can say that the Court has essentially maintained the view in Rajeev Chaudhary by a 2-1 split in the current case.

Thus, the greater part sentiments need conviction on the issue that was being talked about. Lokur, J. furthermore, Pant, J. indicated the language of Section 167 Cr.P.C. being dangerous, and it is evident that the issues will persevere without clear authoritative mediation. Offered how this input has just maintained the norm – for Rajeev Chaudhary had just controlled the forces of analytical offices on this front, it is impossible that this will occur.

Teleologically, maybe that is for the best all things considered. On another note, the larger part conclusion warrants adulation for changing the system of default bail by setting a more prominent onus on the courts.

It has for some time been recognized how charged people keep on moping in guardianship notwithstanding being qualified for default bail, simply because of poor legitimate help. While I have frequently observed preliminary courts advising blamed individual’s for their privileges, an exacting respecting of the Court’s perceptions in Rakesh Kumar Paul can positively assist the reason. “The Petitioner had also made an argument trying to construe the maximum period of punishment as seven years using the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act 2013, which was roundly rejected by all courts hearing the case.”